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Abstract—We present our research towards the design of a
computational framework capable of modelling the formation
and evolution of global patterns (i.e. group structures) in a
population of social individuals. The framework is intended to
be used in collaborative environments, e.g. social serious games
and computer simulations of artificial societies. The theoretical
basis of our research, together with current state of the art and
future work, are briefly introduced.
Index Terms—Global Pattern Formation, Collaborative Learn-
ing Environments, Complex Adaptive Systems, Complexity.
I. INTRODUCTION
The interactions among a population of social individuals
(agents) — due to factors such as the agents’ attitude, per-
sonality, cultural biases and stereotypes, and history of past
interactions [1] — yield complex dynamics which lead to
the formation of global patterns [2]. Global patterns, which
may also be considered as the behaviour of a system as a
whole, include group identities and norms, and influence the
behaviour of the system’s individuals in an indirect, implicit
manner [2]. They can generate and aggravate social conflicts,
such as discrimination and other forms of inequality. The
computational model of global patterns and their impact on
the society can serve as an instrument for understanding the
causes of social conflicts and for evaluating the effectiveness
of intervention methods for conflict resolution. A way to effec-
tively detect global pattern formations is through modelling the
local-to-global transition (e.g. from agent interactions to group
structures). However, doing so is not a trivial task, since the
global structure influences the society-system, creating thus a
recursive complex system1.
The main questions we intend to answer in this research
are: (1) how to model the dynamics of the local-to-global
transition? (2) how to predict the formation and evolution
of global patterns by characterising their internal structures?
(3) what is the nature of the global-to-local transition, and
how does its indirect nature influence the agents? (4) how
to intervene at the global level (e.g. by means of regula-
tions) in order to affect behaviour at the local level? As
our research is informed by the Complex Adaptive Systems
(CAS) literature [1], [2], our intention is to leverage the
concepts, theories and findings of social and behavioural
1Sometimes it is referred to as emergence of complexity [1]
sciences in identifying the emergent properties of complex
systems [3]. Our research is structured into four areas of
investigation: (1) exploration of existing theories on global
pattern formation; these are usually qualitative and focus on
aspects of interaction which are abstract and complex (i.e.
collaboration and fairness); (2) formalisation of the theories
through computational measures and learning algorithms, and
contextualisation of them in realistic social scenarios, such as
social dilemmas; (3) implementation of the social scenarios in
computer simulations of artificial societies [4], [5]; which will
facilitate preliminary validation of our models; (4) extension
of application of our models and social scenarios to human-
based collaborative (virtual) environments, such as multiplayer
games, which will enable final evaluation of the effectiveness
of our models.
As such, global pattern modelling represents a new tool for
the creation of educational environments (serious games) that
convey concepts like conflict, collaboration, and fairness. Fur-
ther afield than educational environments, global pattern mod-
elling may contribute to research fields such as behavioural and
social sciences, evolutionary dynamics, collective behaviour,
as well as macroeconomics and political sciences.
II. STATE OF OUR RESEARCH
We are currently conducting experiments based on arti-
ficial societies to establish optimal learning algorithms and
metrics for detecting consolidated group identities (i.e. the
ability of an individual to identify himself or herself with
his or her group [6]) in the population. The agents interact
with each other by means of the social ultimatum bargain
game [7]. Several initial configurations representing different
group identities (which imply social preferences [8]) have been
defined and are being maintained, that is, the agents will not
adapt their behaviours in response to behavioural dynamics.
We now briefly describe the society’s interaction protocol and
the structure of the Group Modelling framework (GM) which
allows us to detect group identities.
A. The Social Ultimatum Bargain Game in Use
The interaction protocol is hereby briefly introduced. (1) a
population P of n agents are first divided into m partitions
P ; (2) for each partition, an agent ai is randomly selected
to become the provider agent of the social ultimatum bargain
game, all the other agents of the partition become receiver
agents; (3) the provider agent bargains with each receiver agent
over an equal endowment e. For each bargain, ai proposes an
offer 0 ≤ oi,j ≤ e to receiver agent aj ; according to the social
relationship between the agents — which are consequence
of the agents’ group identities — the offers will vary in
generosity [8]; (4) aj can either accept the offer or refuse it; (5)
the final outcome for aj is either 0 or oi,j ; the final outcome
for ai is the sum of all the (e− oi,j) accepted bargains.
B. Measuring Levels of Cooperation
To detect the existence of sub-groups in the population,
and to assign a group identity to the individuals, we analyse
the different levels of cooperation amongst the agents through
their interactions [6]. Our hypothesis is that by observing the
level of cooperation [9] of a provider agent with respect to the
whole partition Pk, we can understand which receiver agents
he prefers to bargain with. This would imply that he is more
altruistic and collaborative [9] with some of the agents in the
partition, hence is more likely to share the same group identity.
For the current state of our research we are considering
both deterministic and stochastic metrics of provider agent’s
favourability which return a value indicating whether the
agents under consideration belong to the same group or not
(in/out-group values [6]). We will refer to the metrics as
interaction classifiers, denoted with I.
C. Learning Collaboration
To learn cooperation values among the individuals which
encompass the history of past interactions [1] we are currently
considering the following Constant-α Monte Carlo update rule
for non-stationary environments [10]:
Ci,j(t) = Ci,j(t− 1) + α [It − Ci,j(t)] (1)
Ci,j(t) is the cooperation value between the provider agent
ai and the receiver agent aj up to the t-th interaction, It
is the level-of-cooperation-value computed by the interaction
classifier introduced in Section II-B, and α is a constant step-
size parameter. Finally, collaboration values are obtained by





(Ci,j + Cj,i) (2)
D. Detecting Group Identities
The collaboration values C4i,j are then used as a dissimilarity
matrix by a clustering algorithm. The number of group identi-
ties and the corresponding agents are then determined. We are
currently investigating the use of the complete-link clustering
algorithm with elbow rule as validity method.
III. FUTURE WORK
Our future work will follow four concurrent paths. First, we
will investigate optimal methods and parameters for making
the framework robust with respect to the size of the society
(n), locality (m), and partial observability of the interactions
(m). To this end, we are already in the process of defining a
group-based metric of fairness. As fairness of offer distribution
is an abstract, subjective, and ambiguous term, we designed
several ad-hoc metrics of fairness based on key and generic
elements of fair offers, such as the offered amount and the
need of the receivers. We then tested these against human
notions of fairness, by running a crowdsourcing experiment in
which participants were asked to compare levels of fairness
of dissimilar offer distribution scenarios in a resource man-
agement game environment [11]. Preliminary results suggest
that some of our fairness metrics are consistent with human
notions of fairness and are both accurate and robust across
different game scenarios and levels of fairness distribution
complexity. Second, we will enrich the level of complexity of
the artificial agents, e.g. by representing affect and enabling
adaptation; we will also augment the possibilities of social
interactions by introducing other social dilemmas, such as
the tragedy of the commons [6]. Third, we will investigate
methods for modelling the internal group structures, such as
leaderships and norms [12], and the inter-group dynamics (e.g.
evolution). We will also investigate methods to intervene at
global level (e.g. by modifying the interaction protocols) in
order to affect, in a feedback loop, the behaviour of the society,
in order to achieve envisaged goals, such as the maximisation
of collaboration or the reduction of social inequalities. Finally,
we will consider game-based environment, and will increase
its level of abstraction by concealing money-related notions
and instead representing social conflict scenarios [9].
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